

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-20

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 EB-11 TRSE-00 ACDA-19 IO-13 NIC-01

RSR-01 /119 W

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O 112030Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3498

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE

AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 3066

E.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OAS, CU, VE

SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN INITIATIVE ON CUBA

REF: STATE 158486

1. SUMMARY: IF VENEZUELA INTRODUCES ITS PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON RELATIONS WITH CUBA AT THE OAS COUNCIL AND IT COMES TO A VOTE, GUATEMALA'S FOREIGN MINISTER ARENALES STRONGLY ARGUES FOR GUATEMALA'S ABSTENTION; AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT EL SALVADOR'S FOREIGN MINISTER BORGONOVO ALSO FAVORS EL SALVADOR'S ABSTENTION IN SUCH A VOTE.

2. GUATEMALA'S FOREIGN MINISTER ARENALES CAME TO SAN SALVADOR ON AUGUST 10 TO DECORATE HIS SALVADORAN COUNTERPART BORGONOVO WITH THE ORDER OF THE QUETZAL AT AN EVENING RECEPTION. FOLLOWING THE CEREMONY, I ASCERTAINED FROM SALVADORAN UNDER-SECRETARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

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CASTANEDU THAT HIS MINISTRY HAD NOT YET LEARNED ABOUT VENEZUELA'S

LATEST INITIATIVE ON CUBA. I BROUGHT HIM UP TO DATE AND GAVE HIM THE US POSITION ON VENEZUELA'S PROPOSAL.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, GUATEMALAN AMBASSADOR MONTERROSO SOUGHT ME OUT AT ARENALES' BEHEST TO ASK WHAT I KNEW ABOUT VENEZUELA'S INITIATIVE, AND LED ME TO ARENALES SO THAT I COULD APPRISE HIM DIRECTLY. ARENALES PROFESSED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT A NEW VENEZUELAN INITIATIVE UNTIL HIS MINISTRY PHONED HIM A LITTLE EARLIER THAT EVENING

TO GIVE HIM A SKETCHY REPORT FOLLOWING US EMBASSY GUATEMALA'S DEMARCH ON THE SUBJECT.

4. AT THIS POINT WE WERE JOINED BY FONMIN BORGONOVO. I RELATED THE DETAILS OF VENEZUELA'S INITIATIVE TO THEM, DESCRIBED THE US POSITION AND EXPRESSED WASHINGTON'S HOPE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD SHARE OUR VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL INADVISABILITY AND JURIDICAL DEFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION.

5. WITH BORGONOVO'S OCCASIONAL NODS AND BRIEF COMMENTS OF ASSENT, ARENALES LAUNCHED INTO A LONG RATIONALE WHICH BOILED DOWN TO THE FOLLOWING: GUATEMALA'S AND HIS OWN RECORD OF OPPOSITION TO CASTRO'S CUBA AND COMMUNISM IS LONG AND WELL-ESTABLISHED. HE RECOGNIZES VENEZUELA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN OBJECTIVES IN ESPOUSING SUCH A RESOLUTION ON CUBA ("VENEZUELA IS IN AN ELECTION PERIOD"). HE APPRECIATES THAT THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION IS JURIDICALLY DEFECTIVE AND POLITICALLY UNDESIRABLE. NEVERTHELESS, GUATEMALA IS NOW ALSO IN THE MIDST OF AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE GOG MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE OVER-SHELMING MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS NEITHER DISCERN NOR CARE ABOUT SUCH

CONSIDERATIONS. PUBLIC OPINION, THOUGH SIMPLISTIC AND PROBABLY SHORT-SIGHTED, CANNOT BE IGNORED BY THE GOG AND SHAPES UP ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: THE US IS RAPIDLY NORMALIZING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR AND LESSER COMMUNIST STATES NOW THAT THE COLD WAR IS DEFINITELY A THING OF THE PAST; IT EVEN RECENTLY ARRANGED AN ANTI-HIJACKING PACT WITH CUBA. WITH ITS OWN INTERESTS UPPERMOST, THE US SOLD WHEAT TO FEED COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WHILE GUATEMALANS HAVE BEEN LEFT TO FACE SHORTAGES AND HUNGER. VENEZUELA, THE ORIGINAL AGGRIEVED STATE, IS NOW LEADING A CAMPAIGN TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA. WHY SHOULD WE BE MORE PAPIST

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THAN THE POPE? ALTHOUGH CUBA MAY HAVE PLANTED THE SEED OF INSURGENCY IN GUATEMALA, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECENT PAST OF MATERIEL CUBAN SUPPORT OF SUCH INSURGENCY. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WAS A RECENT VICTIM OF AN ATTEMPTED INSURGENCY WITH REPORTED CUBAN SUPPORT; YET IT BROUGHT NO CHARGES BEFORE THE OAS THUS DISCOUNTING ALLEGATIONS ABOUT CUBAN INVOLVEMENT. CUBA IS NO LONGER A REAL THREAT TO SECURITY AND STPKLIPFUK# UNDER THE FOREGOING

CIRCUMSTANCES, OF WHAT INTEREST IS IT TO GUATEMALA TO ACCEDE TO  
US PRESSURE TO BE A PARTY TO PROLONG WHAT HAS BECOME SIMPLY  
A STERILE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CUBA AND THE US?

6. FACED WITH SUCH A PREVAILING PUBLIC OPINION AND INCREASING  
PRESSURES FROM THE LEFT IN THE MIDST OF AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN,  
ARENALES SAID, "I MUST EMPHATICALLY STATE OUR POSITION AS  
FAVORING ABSTENTION IF VENEZUELA'S PROPOSED RESOLUTION COMES TO  
A VOTE IN THE OAS COUNCIL". ARENALES THOUGHT IT PROBABLE THAT  
VENEZUELA MIGHT GET 12 FAVORABLE VOTES WITH COLOMBIA'S SUPPORT.  
(I MENTIONED THAT COSTA RICA IS REPORTEDLY PREPARING ITS OWN  
PROPOSAL, ABOUT WHICH WE HAD OUR DOUBTS, AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT  
SUPPORT VENEZUELA'S PROPOSAL).

7. I STRESSED THAT IF VENEZUELA OBTAINED A FAVORABLE MAJORITY,  
WHETHER 12 VOTES OR LESS BECAUSE OF ABSTENTIONS, THE EFFECT MIGHT  
WELL BE TO UNDERMINE IRREPARABLY THE RIO TREATY, FURTHER PREJUDICE  
THE OAS AND INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND LEAVE FIDEL CASTRO AS THE ONLY  
BENEFICIARY. ARENALES COUNTERED THAT IN A CRUNCH, EVEN WITHOUT THE  
RIO TREATY OR AN EFFECTIVE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, THE US WOULD STEP  
IN TO DETER ANY SIGNIFICANT SECURITY THREAT IN THE CARIBBEAN  
AREA. OUR CONVERSATION ENDED ON THAT NOTE.

8. BORGONOVO'S INTERJECTIONS THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION WERE  
INFREQUENT AND BRIEF BUT TENDED TO SUPPORT ARENALES' RATIONALE AND  
WERE IN KEEPING WITH HIS OWN VIEWS OF THE CUBAN PROBLEM AS REVEALED  
IN PREVIOUS REPORTED CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR CATTO IN  
RECENT MONTHS. I TOLD BORGONOVO THAT I WOULD BE CALLING ON HIM  
NEXT WEEK TO ASCERTAIN THE GOES' INTENTIONS ABOUT THE VENEZUELAN  
INITIATIVE.  
MOSKOWITZ

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED, WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.CONFIDENTIAL  
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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Type:** TE  
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